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Abstract
This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing
performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with
the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an
allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-asoffer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed
mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the
payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms
the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into
account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price
competition.
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1. Introduction:
In the U.S. electricity wholesale market, independent system operators (ISOs) run
daily auctions to allocate contracts to suppliers of electric power. Each such auction
functions as follows. First, suppliers submit oﬀers to the ISO in the form of energy price
curves and start-up costs. Second, the ISO allocates contracts to suppliers in such a way
as to minimize costs as calculated from the oﬀer sheets. Finally, suppliers are paid for
the energy ordered. However each supplier is paid not the oﬀered price, but the market
clearing price. Examples below will illustrate the process.
Much of the discussion to date involving multi-unit auctions has focused on comparing
the eﬃciency and revenue consequences of auction mechanisms with diﬀerent ﬁnal payment
methods (for example pay at oﬀered price and pay at the market clearing price). See for
example Ausubel and Cramton (2002), Hortacsu (2002) and Kahn, Cramton, Porter and
Tabors (2001). However, in wholesale electricity multi-unit auctions there are two distinct
components to the mechanism which need to be considered; the algorithm an ISO uses to
assign contracts to generators and the ﬁnal payment method. This paper takes as given the
current payment method, pay-at-MCP, and compares the cost-minimizing performances
of two algorithms; the algorithm in current use which assigns contracts so as to minimize
total oﬀered cost and a new proposed method, which assigns contracts so as to minimize
the actual ﬁnal payment which is based on the market clearing price.
It has been pointed out by Yan and Stern (2000) that current auctions as described
above do not minimize procurement costs, since they assign contracts that minimize costs
calculated from oﬀer sheets, while suppliers are actually paid the market clearing price
(MCP). This motivated Luh et al. (2003) to develop an algorithm that assigns contracts
that minimize actual procurement costs. Henceforth the term “pay-as-oﬀer formulation”
will describe the algorithm currently used by ISO’s in electricity auctions and “pay-at-MCP
formulation” will describe auctions that assign contracts that minimize actual procurement
costs. It is most important to keep in mind that the phrase “pay-as-oﬀer” in “pay-as-oﬀer
formulation” refers to the objective function minimized as does “pay-at-MCP” in “pay-atMCP formulation,” but in both formulations, actual payment is made at MCP. See Luh
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et al. (2003) for the diﬃculties involved and methods used in creating an algorithm to
implement a pay-at-MCP formulation.
The argument that pay-at-MCP formulation will generate procurement costs that are
sometimes lower and never higher than those generated by the pay-as-oﬀer formulation
because the pay-at-MCP formulation minimizes the correct objective function fails to take
into account the eﬀects of strategic behavior by suppliers. In particular, if suppliers tailor
their oﬀers to the type of auction they face, it is no longer obvious that the pay-atMCP formulation will generate lower procurement costs. Studies by Alonso, Trias, Gaitau
and Alba (1999) and Vázquez, Rivier and Peŕez (2002) which compare the two auction
mechanisms, also fail to consider strategic behavior by suppliers.
In this paper we compare the procurement-cost-minimizing performances of the two
formulations, taking into account strategic behavior by the suppliers.
Of course the above is a simpliﬁed description of the electricity wholesale market. For
example, ISOs run day ahead auctions and same day auctions; grid network constraints
aﬀect markets; and markets vary from region to region. In addition, ISOs run retail
auctions in which utility companies and other load bearing entities submit demand bids.
For an overview of U.S. electricity markets, see Hunt (2002).
In Section 2 an example is presented of a simple market with one ISO and two suppliers, one of which has two strategies: price low and price high. In this one-person game,
counterintuitively, the pay-at-MCP formulation generates higher procurement costs than
the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
In Section 3 we show that the above example is an anomaly. For markets with two
suppliers, the pay-at-MCP formulation generates lower procurement costs than the payas-oﬀer formulation more often than it generates higher procurement costs.
In Section 4, we show that as price competition increases the advantage of the proposed
algorithm increases. To model competition a third supplier, identical to one of the existing
suppliers, is added to the market and consequently the suppliers engage in Bertrand competition. In this framework the pay-at-MCP formulation generates procurement costs that
are sometimes lower and never higher than those generated by the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Studying increased competition in small markets is a proxy for studying large markets. The
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direct study of large markets with strategic bidding by suppliers is an intractable problem,
due to the complexity of the pay-at-MCP and pay-as-oﬀered algorithms.
There are other studies of strategic behavior by suppliers in wholesale electricity markets. For example Spear (2003) studies strategic behavior by suppliers from a general
equilibrium perspective. In a study by Le Coq (2002) suppliers precommit to capacity
levels, then compete in a pay-at-MCP formulation auction. Suppliers are found to have
an incentive to withhold capacity.
Supatgiat, Zhang and Birge (2001) present an algorithm that produces Nash equilibria
(proﬁles of mutual best response oﬀers) for the currently used pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
We will not use this algorithm in our work below because we will restrict ourselves to
simple markets where the algorithm is not needed. We restrict ourselves to simple markets
because 1) there is no known algorithm to produce Nash equilibria for the pay-at-MCP
formulation in non-simple markets and 2) in simple markets it is possible to compare the
cost-minimizing performance of equilibria for the two formulations in all markets of a
certain type, and then determine which formulation outperforms the other. We can then
gain some idea of how the two formulations compare in larger markets by introducing
competition into smaller markets.
In short, a theoretical study of concentrated markets that takes into account strategic
behavior by suppliers provides evidence favoring the adoption by ISOs of the pay-at-MCP
formulation for wholesale electricity auctions.
Finally, we compare the pay-as-oﬀer formulation with the pay-at-MCP formulation
because they are, respectively, the wholesale electricity auction mechanism in current use
and a proposed mechanism for which an implementing algorithm has already been constructed. Procurement cost minimization performance has been chosen as the basis for
comparison, since 1) cost minimization is the most obvious goal of supply auctions (just as
revenue maximization is the most obvious goal of demand auctions), 2) low procurement
costs are reﬂected in low prices to consumers which in the electric power market is one
measure of social welfare, 3) under the Federal Power Act The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s main goal “is to achieve wholesale electricity markets that produce just and
reasonable prices and work for customers” (FERC, 2003), 4) Although deregulation of
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some industries has resulted in lower prices to customers, there have been no such savings
in the electricity market (Apt, 2005). Future work could compare the two algorithms on
the basis of other social goals such as eﬃciency, fairness and security.
2. Example 1: A Simple Wholesale Electricity Market Auction.
Consider a wholesale electricity market with two suppliers and one ISO. Supplier 1
has start-up cost zero and two strategies, oﬀer low (Ol ) and oﬀer high (Oh ). Supplier 1
can supply 0, 1 or 2 units of energy, Ol (1) = Ol (2) = 25 dollars per unit and Oh (1) =
Oh (2) = 40. Supplier 2 has start-up cost 20, and can supply one unit and O1 (1) = 10.
The ISO’s demand is inelastic and equal to 2.
In Game 1, the ISO uses the pay-as-oﬀer formulation to allocate contracts. In Game 2
the ISO uses the pay-at-MCP formulation. These are one-person games, since Supplier 1 is
the only party with more than one strategy. These two 1-person games could be combined
into one two-person game, but our goal is to compare the outcomes of two auctions, not
ﬁnd the outcome of one more complex auction.
Game 1: Pay-as-oﬀer Formulation.
The ISO calculates procurement costs as the minimum of the pay-as-oﬀer cost of
buying 1 unit from each supplier and the pay-as-oﬀer cost of buying 2 units from Supplier
1.
If Supplier 1 submits Ol , the ISO calculates procurement cost as
min{20 + 10 + 25, 2(25)} = 2(25) = 50 and Supplier 1’s payoﬀ is 50.
If Supplier 1 submits Oh , the ISO calculates procurement costs as
min{20 + 10 + 40, 2(40)} = 20 + 10 + 40 = 70 and Supplier 1’s payoﬀ is 40.
Therefore in equilibrium Supplier 1 oﬀers low, the MCP is 25 and the actual procurement cost is 50.
Notice that in calculating Supplier 1’s payoﬀs, the generation costs have not been
subtracted from 1’s revenues. In other words it has been assumed that generation costs are
such that subtracting them oﬀ does not change the ordinal relationships between payoﬀs.
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This assumption keeps the example simple and avoids breaking the seven cases in the next
section into multiple subcases. Generation costs will not be ignored in Section 4, where
they can be handled without undue complication.
Game 2: Pay-at-MCP Formulation.
The ISO calculates procurement costs as the minimum of the pay-at-MCP cost of
buying 1 unit from each supplier and the pay-at-MCP cost of buying 2 units from Supplier
1.
If Supplier 1 submits Ol , the ISO calculates procurement cost as
min{20 + 25 + 25, 2(25)} = 2(25) = 50 and Supplier 1’s payoﬀ is 50.
If Supplier 1 submits Oh , the ISO calculates procurement costs as
min{20 + 40 + 40, 2(40)} = 2(40) = 80 and Supplier 1’s payoﬀ is 80.
Therefore in equilibrium Supplier 1 oﬀers high, the MCP is 40 and the actual procurement cost is 80.
Comparing Games 1 and 2, counterintuitively the pay-at-MCP formulation generates
higher procurement costs, despite minimizing the correct objective function. In Section 3
Example 1 is shown to be an anomaly. In Section 4 it will be seen that when a competitor
for Supplier 1 is added to the market, no analog of Example 1 exists.
3. Simple Two-Supplier Auctions.
In order to see if Example 1 is typical, we will examine the simplest two-supplier
auctions. First we will examine Games 3 and 4 which are identical with Games 1 and
2 respectively, except that the start-up cost for Supplier 2 is S > 0, Supplier 2’s oﬀer
is O2 (1) = A > 0 and Supplier 1’s strategies are Ol (1) = Ol (2) = L > 0 and Oh (1) =
Oh (2) = H > L.
The solutions to Games 3 and 4 break naturally into four cases.
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Case 1. S + A < L.
Game 3. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + A + L, 2L} = S + A + L

π1 (Ol ) = L

Oh : min {S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H

π1 (Oh ) = H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is S + 2H.
Game 4. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + 2L, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + 2H, 2H} = 2H

π1 (Oh ) = 2H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is 2H.
In Case 1, procurement cost is lower in the pay-at-MCP formulation.
Case 2. L < S + A < H and 2L < H.
Game 3. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + A + L, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H

π1 (Oh ) = H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is S + 2H.
Game 4. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + max {2A, 2L}, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + 2H, 2H} = 2H

π1 (Oh ) = 2H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is 2H.
In Case 2, procurement cost is lower in the pay-at-MCP formulation.
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Case 3. L < S + A < H and 2L > H.
Game 3. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + A + L, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + A + H, 2H} = S + A + H

π1 (Oh ) = H

1 submits Ol and procurement cost is 2L.
Game 4. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + max {2A, 2L}, 2L} = 2L
Oh : min {S + 2H, 2H} = 2H

π1 (Ol ) = 2L
π1 (Oh ) = 2H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is 2H.
In Case 3, the procurement cost is lower in the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Case 4. H < S + A.
Game 3. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + A + L, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + A + H, 2H} = 2H

π1 (Oh ) = 2H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is 2H.
Game 4. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + max {2A, 2L}, 2L} = 2L

π1 (Ol ) = 2L

Oh : min {S + max {2A, 2H}, 2H} = 2H

π1 (Oh ) = 2H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is 2H.
In Case 4, the procurement cost is the same for both formulations.
The less likely knife-edge cases such as S + A = L have been omitted.
Before we assess the results, we should examine the other simple two-supplier auctions.
In Game 5 and 6 the player with non-zero start-up costs has two strategies. Supplier 1’s
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start-up cost is S > 0, 1’s strategies are Ol (1) = L > 0 and Oh (1) = H > L, and
O2 (1) = O2 (2) = A > 0. Game 5 is a pay-as-oﬀer formulation auction and Game 6 is a
pay-at-MCP formulation auction.
Case A. S + H < A.
Game 5. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + L + A, 2A} = S + L + A

π1 (Ol ) = L

Oh : min {S + H + A, 2A} = S + H + A

π1 (Oh ) = H

1 submits Oh and procurement cost is S + 2A.
Game 6. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + 2A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

Oh : min {S + 2A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Oh ) = 0

1 submits Ol or Oh and procurement cost is 2A.
In Case A, procurement cost is higher in the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Case B. S + L < A < S + H.
Game 5. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + L + A, 2A} = S + L + A

π1 (Ol ) = L

Oh : min {S + H + A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Oh ) = 0

1 submits Ol and procurement cost is S + 2A.
Game 6. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + 2A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

Oh : min {S + max {2A, 2H}, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

1 submits Ol or Oh and procurement cost is 2A.
In Case B, procurement cost is higher in the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
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Case C. A < S + L.
Game 5. Pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
Ol : min {S + L + A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

Oh : min {S + H + A, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Oh ) = 0

1 submits Ol or Oh and procurement cost is 2A.
Game 6. Pay-at-MCP formulation.
Ol : min {S + max {2A, 2L}, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

Oh : min {S + max {2A, 2H}, 2A} = 2A

π1 (Ol ) = 0

1 submits Ol or Oh and procurement cost is 2A.
In Case C, procurement costs are the same in both formulations.
In summary, in determining the procurement costs in the simplest two-supplier markets there are seven cases to be considered. In four of these cases the procurement cost is
higher under the pay-as-oﬀer formulation, and in only one case, the case corresponding to
Example 1, is the procurement cost higher under pay-at-MCP formulation.
Even if we consider only Cases 1-4, corresponding to Games 3 and 4, which were
constructed using Example 1 as a template, the pay-at-MCP formulation outperforms the
pay-as-oﬀer formulation two cases to one.
The outcome of Example 1 is atypical in small, simple markets.
Next it will be shown that when a competitor for the two-strategy supplier is introduced into Games 3 and 4, there are no cases in which the pay-at-MCP formulation
generates higher procurement cost. This indicates that in a market with several suppliers
the likely increase in competition over that in a small market will lead to an increase in
the pay-at-MCP formulation advantage over the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
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4. An Added Competitor.
Some facts about a generalized version of Bertrand competition will be useful in our
discussion of a three-supplier wholesale electricity market.
Consider the following two player game. Fix N > L. For i = 1, 2 let


πi (p1 , p2 ) =

G(pi ) if pi < p−i and pi < N ;
g(pi ) if pi = p−i < N ;
0
otherwise

(1)

where G:  → (−∞, B] and g:  → (−∞, B] for some B > 0, G(p) < 0 and g(p) < 0 if
p < L, G(p) = g(p) = 0 if p = L, G(p) > 0 and g(p) > 0 if L < p < N , and if L < p < N
then there exists p < p such that G(p ) > g(p).

Proposition 1. (L, L) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the generalized Bertrand competition game defined by (1).

Proposition 1 follows from Theorem 2 of Baye and Morgan (2002), since in their proof
of that theorem, the role of their condition c), left lower semicontinuity of G, can be played
by our condition relating G and g.
Now we consider a wholesale electricity market with three suppliers and one ISO.
Supplier 1 has start-up cost zero; has a continuum of strategies: oﬀer price p dollars per
unit, p real; can supply 1 or 2 units of energy; and faces generation costs L dollars per
unit, L > 0. Supplier 2 is identical to Supplier 1. Supplier 3 has start-up cost S > 0; can
supply 1 unit of energy; and has one strategy: oﬀer price A > 0. There is an N > L such
that the ISO demands 2 units if the MCP for 2 units is less than N , 1 unit if the MCP
for 2 units is greater than or equal to N and the MCP for 1 unit is less than N , and zero
otherwise.
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Game 7. Pay as oﬀer formulation

pi − L








3(pi − L)/2








2(pi − L)




πi (p1 , p2 ) = (pi − L)/2







5(pi − L)/6








pi − L





0

if pi < p−i and S + A < pi < N ;
if pi < p−i and S + A = pi < N ;
if pi < p−i , pi < N and pi < S + A ;
if pi = p−i and S + A < pi < N ;
if pi = p−i and pi = S + A < N ;
if pi = p−i , pi < N and pi < S + A ;
otherwise

This game is a generalized Bertrand competition as deﬁned by (1) and the conditions
following (1). Therefore (L, L) is the unique Nash equilibrium. The allocation of contracts
depends on the relationship between S + A and L. If S + A < L, then the ISO orders
one unit from Supplier 3, 1/2 unit from Supplier 1 and 1/2 unit from Supplier 2. The
procurement cost is S + 2L. If L < S + A then the ISO orders 1 unit from Supplier 1 and
1 unit from Supplier 2. The procurement cost is 2L.
Game 8 . Pay-at-MCP formulation.

πi (p1 , p2 ) =

2(pi − L)
pi − L
0

if pi < p−i and pi < N ;
if pi = p−i < N ;
otherwise

This game is a generalized Bertrand competition. Therefore the only Nash equilibrium is
(L, L). The ISO orders 1 unit from Supplier 1 and 1 unit form Supplier 2. The Procurement
cost is 2L.
In summary, if S + A < L, then the procurement cost is higher under the pay-asoﬀer formulation; and if L < S + A, then the procurement cost under the pay-as-oﬀer
formulation is equal to the procurement cost under the pay-at-MCP formulation. In other
words, when Supplier 1 has a competitor, there is no analog to Example 1. The pay-atMCP formulation outperforms the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
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Concluding Remarks.
In this paper we took the current ﬁnal payment method, pay at the market clearing price, as given in day-ahead electricity auctions and compared the procurement cost
minimizing performance of the current algorithm mechanism used by ISO’s (pay-as-oﬀer)
and a proposed mechanism (pay-at-MCP). First an example was presented in which, counterintuitively, the pay-at-MCP formulation generated higher procurement costs than the
pay-as-oﬀer formulation. Next, we showed that the above example is an anomaly. For markets with two suppliers, the pay-at-MCP formulation generates lower procurement costs
than the pay-as-oﬀer formulation more often than it generates higher procurement costs.
Next, we showed that as competition increases the performance of the proposed algorithm
improves. When there is price competition even in small markets the pay-at-MCP formulation generates procurement costs that are sometimes lower and never higher than those
generated by the pay-as-oﬀer formulation.
As a ﬁnal comment, some ISOs pay only part of the start-up costs associated with
the suppliers chosen. Since our Example 1 is driven by start-up costs, the pay-at-MCP
formulation performance advantage documented above will be even greater for those ISOs
that pay only part of start-up costs.
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